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     SUMMARY 
By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that 
Constructive Empiricism – B.C. van Fraassen’s much debated and explored view of 
science – is inconsistent.  We then argue there are at least two ways out of our 
Inconsistency Argument, one of which is more easily to square with Constructive 
Empiricism than the other. 
 
 
1.  The Inconsistency Argument 
We shall argue that there is a tension if not an inconsistency between B.C. van 
Fraassen’s well-known view of science, Constructive Empiricism (CE)1, and his less 
well-known view on intentionality. In this opening Section, we collect a number of 
premises (mostly from CE) and expound an argument in favour of the 
inconsistency of CE that will set the stage of this paper; then we provide an outline 
of this paper. 
 
The distinction between observable and unobservable concrete objects (events, 
processes, facts) is one of the conceptual pillars of CE. For one thing, the doxastic 
policy of CE to believe only those accepted propositions of science that are about 
observables only, and to remain neutral with regard to all other accepted 
propositions, relies on the mentioned distinction.  For another thing, the analysis 
of empirical adequacy, which is the epistemic aim of science according to CE, 
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crucially involves the distinction. So here is the first premise of our argument, 
which is a definition: 
 
(Obs) Characterisation of Observability. A concrete object X (event, process) being 
observable to us, human beings of sound mind and eye-sight, means that there 
are circumstances such that if we were in those circumstances, we would 
observe X.2   
Characterisation (Obs) makes observability an anthropocentric, dispositional, 
extrinsic, somewhat vague and yet a perfectly objective concept, just like 
portability and edibility are perfectly objective concepts which are also 
anthropocentric, dispositional, extrinsic and somewhat vague. (Obs) also governs 
the use of the word ‘observable’ in common English and is therefore constitutive 
for the meaning of the word ‘observable’, as what one expects from a definition of a 
word in use.  
 
The second premise of our argument we call 
 
(Nat) The Naturalisation Thesis of Observability. The observability of a concrete 
object X is an extrinsic property of X, which relates the observed to the observer. 
The observability of X is wholly determined by: (i) the physiological and physical 
properties of our sense organs (our capacity to observe things, like our capacity 
to move our limbs, to digest food, to breathe air, to hear sounds, and what have 
you); (ii) the relevant physical properties of X (size and reflectance of electro-
magnetic radiation), and (iii) by the physical interaction between X and our 
sense organs. The extension of observability is a matter of scientific inquiry, not 
of philosophical analysis, to be conducted in the laboratory and outdoors rather 
than behind the desk or in the comfy chair. Succinctly, observability is a 
concept that can be naturalised, it can be characterised in terms of physical 
concepts only.3  
 
Typically the concepts of the natural sciences (physics, chemistry, astronomy, 
geology, physiology, etc.) are or can be naturalised (i.e., they can be reduced to 
physical concepts), whereas most of the concepts of psychology and history, say, 
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turn out to resist naturalisation and arguably cannot be naturalised at all. 
Psychological (or mental) concepts usually are straightforwardly intentional 
(thinking, believing, dreaming, etc.) or figure in descriptions of intentional 
behaviour (kissing, writing, hating, loving, singing, attending, etc.). Concepts that 
are or can be naturalised are also called physicalist concepts. 
 
Van Fraassen has advanced precisely such anti-reductionist claims about human 
agency and the intentional idiom generally when defending CE. This gives us the 
third premise. 
 
(AR) Anti-Reductionism.  Descriptions of human behaviour as intentional actions, 
as manifestations of human agency, cannot be reduced to, or faithfully 
translated in, physicalist vocabulary.  “CE would be saddled with a type of 
behaviourism which I am not able to take at all seriously”, says Van Fraassen; 
and elsewhere: “the body and its physical interactions are the subject of physics 
and physiology, not so my actions”.4  In brief, intentional concepts are not 
physicalist; they cannot be naturalised. 
Next we consider the fourth premise; it is not a thesis typical for CE but a 
conceptual truth; it provides a sufficient condition for calling a concept 
‘intentional’: 
(Int) If a predicate F describes a manifestation of human agency, of goal-oriented 
behaviour, then F expresses an intentional concept.  
In general, descriptions of intentional behaviour, of the form ‘person p is 
intentionally F-ing’, or ‘p is F-ing with the intention to G’, make the concept 
expressed by predicate F intentional. Agency and intentionality are two sides of the 
same coin: an event involving a person qualifies as an action, as a manifestation of 
human agency, iff it has at least one intentional description.5 Giovanni Cassini 
was observing a ‘red permanent spot’ on the face of the planet Jupiter; Jan 
Swammerdan was observing ‘bloodless little animals’ under the microscope; 
Christiaan Huygens was observing the rings of the planet Saturn; Charles Darwin 
was observing finches on the Galapagos Islands; Pieter Zeeman was observing the 
splitting of spectral lines in a spectrometer; et cetera ad libitum.  Scientific 
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observers pay consciously visual attention to the objects they observe. These 
examples testify to the following, fifth premise: 
 
 (AgO)  Agency Thesis of Observation. The concept of observation expresses  
 a manifestation of human Agency, of goal-oriented human behaviour.  
 
We now have an explosive mixture of five statements, as the following argument 
shows. 
 
1. Object X being observable to us means that there are circumstances such 
that if we were in those circumstances, we would observe X (Obs). 
2. Observability is a physicalist concept (Obs, Nat).  
3. If F is an intentional concept, then F is not physicalist (AR). 
4. If observability is an intentional concept, then it is not physicalist (from 3 
by instantiation). 
5. Observabililty is not an intentional concept (from 2 and 4). 
6. If a concept F expresses a manifestation of human agency, of goal-oriented 
behaviour, then F is an intentional concept (Int).  
7. If the concept of observation expresses a manifestation of human agency, 
of goal-oriented behaviour, then observation is an intentional concept 
(from 6 by instantiation). 
8. The concept of observation expresses a manifestation of human agency, of 
goal-oriented human behaviour (AgO). 
9. Observation is an intentional concept (from 7 and 8). 
10. If observation is intentional, then also observability (from 1). 
11. Observability is an intentional concept (from 9 and 10). 
12. Contradiction (from 5 and 11). 
 
Call this the The Inconsistency Argument.  Statements (Obs), (Nat), (AR), (Int) and 
(AgO) are jointly inconsistent.  So granted the innocuous premises (Obs), (Int) and 
(AgO), if (Nat) and (AR) are indeed part of CE, then CE is inconsistent by the 
Inconsistency Argument, and faces the dilemma to renounce (Nat) or (AR). This 
much is certain.  
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Is CE committed to the premises of the Inconsistency Argument?  Since premises 
(Obs), (Nat) and (AR) contain literal quotations of Van Fraassen (and are not 
quoted out of context by us, we claim), they are part and parcel of CE. Premise 
(Int) is a conceptual truth, providing a sufficient condition for when to call a 
concept ‘intentional’; and similarly for (AgO). The fact that certain parts of the 
world (‘mental events’, such as having thoughts and feelings, ‘mental processes’, 
such as dreaming and thinking, and, most importantly for us, manifestations of 
human agency, of intentional behaviour) cannot be understood but in a framework 
of viewing agents as persons, as being “embedded in the space of reasons”6, leads 
us directly to the conclusion that observation is an intentional concept (step 9 in 
the Inconsistency Argument).  Hence CE is in trouble. 
 
In the next two Sections, we shall mount a general argument to the effect that any 
philosophical view of science, CE notably included, must adhere to the 
intentionality of observation in order to make sense of science – which is the aim of 
CE. Our argument will consist mainly in a brief analysis of the process of 
observation in science (Sections 2, 3).  This will strengthen our conclusion that CE 
is in trouble, because it strengthens premise (AgO) of the Inconsistency Argument. 
We then explore two exit strategies for CE (Section 4). 
 
 
2. The Process of Observation 
We discern the following Events in the visual process of observation (we do this 
also to regiment our language to a certain but necessary extent; cf. Dretske, 1969). 
An observation will be one of these events [E3] and will come in two kinds. 
[E1] Registration (visually registering object X ): the event of forming of an image 
of object X, on the retina of the eyes when human beings register X, on celluloid 
when a now old-fashioned camera registers X, on a display when a digital 
camera registers X, etc.7 
[E2] Object-seeing (seeing object X ): the event of becoming aware of object X by 
whatever it is that registers the image of X [E1]. Cameras cannot object-see, only 
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living beings can object-see, such as human beings and animal beings; ‘having a 
mind’ or ‘the capacity to become aware of’ is necessary for object-seeing. Subject 
S object-seeing X  results in (or is) having a mental state that is intentional and 
(almost by definition) perceptual. 
 
Becoming aware of something arguably is a matter of degree. When driving your 
car and conversing intensely with your passenger, you are less aware of the 
scenery than when you are driving alone and are paying attention to the road, or 
when the passenger and you are silently admiring the scenery. A person may not 
even be aware at all of something he sees — but later, when questioned, or when 
under hypnosis, it may turn out he did see something ‘unconsciously’ because 
now he reports it. In contrast, cameras never are aware of what they are recording: 
it doesn’t even make sense to say this; they can only register [E1]. 
 
[E3] Observation (observing X, looking at X ): the event of looking at X, paying 
visual attention to X with some particular purpose in mind.  We speak of action-
observation (short for: observation with the intention to act) when the purpose is 
to perform a particular action that involves X  [E3.a].  We speak of doxastic-
oriented observation when the purpose is to acquire beliefs about X  [E3.b].  
Animals cannot observe doxastically [E3.b], only beings that have mastered a 
language have this capacity, notably human beings, when we take this capacity 
to be necessary for being in a mental state of belief; but animals arguably can 
action-observe [E3.a], such as predators observing prey with the purpose to 
catch, kill and eat it. Observation also results in a mental state that is 
intentional (with intentional object X) and is perceptual. 
 
[E4] Doxastic seeing  (seeing that ϕ, for example seeing that X is a G): the event    
of observing object X and acquiring the ability to report a judgement about X, 
like ‘That was a G ’, in particular the ability to answer the question ‘What did 
you see?’ Again, animals cannot see doxastically, only beings that have 
mastered a language have this capacity.8 Subject S doxastic seeing that ϕ 
results in S having a mental state that is intentional (with ϕ as intentional 
object) and is propositional (because its intentional object, ϕ, is a proposition).  
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Logically speaking, both observation [E3] and doxastic seeing [E4] presuppse 
object-seeing [E2], which in turn presupposes visual registration [E1], but the 
converse presupposition relations fail. Observing X doxastically [E3.b] typically 
results in the acquisition of beliefs about X, which one then can report; in other 
words, succesfully observing X doxastically [E3.b] typically leads to doxastic 
seeing-that [E4].  But not the other way around: many of our doxastic beliefs about 
observables we have acquired without having been actively engaged in observation 
[E3.b].  When Johnny says to his colleague Brad that he happened to see his wife 
Angelina yesterday, Johnny has seen her doxastically [E4]; it does not imply that 
Johnny has been observing Angelina [E3], with some purpose in mind — if Johnny 
had said to Brad “I have been observing your wife”, Brad presumably would have 
responded suspiciously.  We point out that the theory-ladenness of observation 
only makes sense when by ‘observation’ here is meant [E3] or [E4]. 
In the light of our disctinctions, there is a danger of committing the fallacy of 
equivocation with respect to ‘observation’ in (AgO). For do we mean that object-
observation [E3] or that doxastic seeing [E4] is a manifestation of human agency?  
We mean both.  So let us be explicit about this and refine (AgO): 
 
(AgO∗)  Refined Agency Thesis of Obsrvation. The concepts of action-observation 
[E3.a], doxastic-oriented observation [E3.b] and doxastic seeing-that [E4] are 
manifestations of human agency, of goal-oriented behaviour. 
 
The Inconsistency Argument remains the same when (AgO∗) replaces (AgO) in 
steps 7 and 8.  
 
In the next Section, we elaborate on observation [E3] and doxastic seeing [E4] by 
arguing that both are indispensable for science − registration [E1] and object-
seeing [E2] are relevant for science only in that they are necessary conditions for 
[E3] and [E4].   
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3.  Observation in Science 
The purpose of observation in science is quite obvious: to acquire beliefs relevant 
to the observer’s scientific purposes and interests, such as the hypothesis he is 
investigating, the instrument he is testing, the theory he is developing or the model 
he is constructing. One can, of course, unexpectedly come to observe something 
and thereby come to believe something (like Johnny accidentally seeing Brad’s wife 
Angelina in the previous Section), something which also happens in science, like 
Alexander Fleming seeing unexpected bacterial growth on a culture dish that had 
been invaded by a mold whose spore must have drifted in through an open window 
of the laboratory; like Hans Christian Orsted happened to see a compas needle 
turn in the vincinity of a cupper wire through which an electric current runs; like 
Luigi Galvani, who was investigating the nerves in frog legs, and had threaded 
some legs on copper wire hanging from a balcony in such a way that a puff of wind 
caused the legs to touch the iron railing, spotted that the legs jerked violently 
when a spark snapped (and, for a moment, a closed circuit arose); like Wilhelm 
Röntgen, who got his hand between a discharge tube and a screen coated with a 
barium compound, and saw the bones of his own hand through the shadow of his 
skin; like Robert Wilson and Arno Penzias stumbling upon an inexplicable signal 
that turned out to be the after-glow of the Big Bang. This shows that doxastic 
seeing-that [E4], like stepping on someone’s toe to mention a more mundane 
example, is not always an intentional action. Not every doxastic seeing-that [E4] is 
an intended doxastic observation [E3.b]. Both such acts are however indispensible 
for science. Any philosophical view of science, e.g. CE, should take heed of them. 
 
This is not to say that objective facts, which can be described using physicalist 
terminology, do not matter for observation. On the contrary. For example, it would 
be irrational for Scarlett to try to observe X if she believes the circumstances do 
not allow her attempt to succeed, or if there are no such things as X’s.  Trying to 
observe the Morning Star on a cloudy morning doesn’t make sense, and trying to 
observe flying buildings in the sky doesn’t make sense either. Van Fraassen’s 
characterisation of what is observable clearly hints at this feature: “there are 
circumstances such that if we were in those circumstances, then we would observe 
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X”9. In science we constantly rearrange our environment in order to create 
favourable circumstances for the observation of whatever we intend or hope to 
observe. All these circumstances can be described without using intentional idiom 
but using only physicalist concepts. 
 
In full generality, the general action-theoretic principle that for any action-type F, 
the conditions on an action token’s being an F-ing extend beyond its being 
performed out of an intention to F, straightforwardly applies to the activities of 
observation. The intention to F could not be successfully executed if the enabling 
circumstances were unfavourable. This structural feature of every intentional 
action − their successful execution being dependent on further, non-intentional 
facts − is inherited by all acts of observing.  
 
Both [E1] registration and [E2] object-seeing can be reconstructed as 
anthropocentric concepts in the sense that both involve visual-registration-by-the-
two-light-detectors-above-our-noses, that is, human eyes. Nevertheless, unlike 
observing X with the intention of acquiring beliefs about X  [E3], and unlike 
observing X and acquiring beliefs about X  [E4], they are not intentional activities. 
Visual registration and [E1] object-seeing [E2] are necessary for the possibility of 
science because they are necessary conditions for observation [E3], but they are 
far from sufficient: nothing of scientific interest can be achieved with only these 
two types of events [E1, E2]. Observation in science has a purpose. 
 
This explains why the inference from ‘Hypatia observes this parchment’ and ‘this 
parchment is a bunch of molecules’ to ‘Hypatia observes a bunch of molecules’ is 
valid under a physicalist reading, but invalid when we add to the first description 
that it was, under that description, intentional – the parchment was the intended 
object of attention of Hypatia, not a bunch of molecules for the concept of a molecule 
was alien to Hypatia.10  The alleged physicalist character of ‘Hypatia observes this 
parchment’ can therefore not be exploited as an argument for the observability of 
unobservables, e.g. molecules (this is precisely Van Fraassen’s own point in 1980: 
214, objection 2). The argument is blocked because ‘Hypatia observes this page’ is 
intentional: she payed attention to the parchment (A) when observing it, not to a 
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particular bunch of molecules (B ) ⎯ in spite of the fact that A = B.  Similarly, when 
private eye Mike is observing John (C), he is not intentionally observing Angelina’s 
father (D) , in spite of the fact that C = D, because Mike may not know that his target 
is Angelina’s father.  
 
In general, if p has the intention to observe X, then p does not necessarily have the 
intention to observe Y, even if X = Y.  In short, observation, unlike registration [E1], 
characterises an intentional activity with the purpose to acquire beliefs about X [E3].   
The acts of observation [E3] and doxastic seeing [E4] are instances of goal-oriented 
human behaviour and this makes these concepts intentional (AgO*). 
 
Our distinction between doxastic observation [E3.b] and doxastic seeing-that [E4] 
preserves the independence of observation from the more complex capacity to 
produce observation reports about the things observed. Scarlett, a member of our 
epistemic community, doxastically observes X and doxastically sees that F(X) – that 
is, she visually attends to X, reports to another member, Penelope, what she has 
observed, who in turn sees Scarlett’s doxastic observations as relevant to the theory 
that she (Penelope) happens to hold.  Doxastically seeing that F(X) by Scarlett was a 
result of her doxastically observing X and therefore intentional, but it did not require 
her to accept or reject a scientific theory according to which F(X). So Scarlett’s act of 
doxastically observing X  [E3] and doxastically seeing that F(X)  [E4] --- 
communicated to Penelope in terms that did not involve acceptance of the theory 
that Scarlett herself happens to hold --- had an impact on the theory that Penelope 
holds. Communication between Scarlett and Penelope creates a situation in which it 
was doxastically seen that F(X) by Penelope [E4], although Penelope herself did not 
doxastically observe X [E3.b].  Such ‘agent-less’ doxastic seeing is more the rule than 
the exception in science. Furthermore, it need not be the same person that is 
registering X, object-seeing X and doxastic seeing that F(X). Science is a collective 
activity. 
 
To summarise, our sketch above of the role of the mentioned observation activities in 
scientific inquiry makes the case for the indispensability of doxastic observation 
[E3.b] and doxastic observation [E4] as part of scientific activity in general, so that 
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they are indispensable too for making sense of science.  The intentional character of 
the doxastic observation [E3] and doxastic seeing [E4] makes these concepts 
intentional.  This secures premise (AgO, AgO*) of the Inconsistency Argument (see 
Section 1).  We therefore re-inforce our conclusion at the end of Section 1: CE is in 
trouble. 
 
 
4.  Exit Strategies 
Is there a way out of the Inconsistency Argument for CE? We can think of two exit 
strategies. 
 
(A)  The most obvious way is to weaken the controversial Naturalisation Thesis of 
Observability (Nat) to claiming that only our capacity to register objects can be 
naturalised, resulting in the hardly controversial ⎯ and rather insipid ⎯ 
Naturalisation Thesis of Registrability. The relevance of this thesis for (philosophy of) 
science resides in the fact that visual registration [E1] is necessary for both doxastic 
observation [E3] and doxastic seeing-that [E4].  Then CE can agree with, if not 
underline everything we have, in the previous Sections, brought to bear on 
observation in science.  In CE, the role of the observable/unobservable-to-us 
distinction would, then, be partly played by the registrable/unregistrable-to-us 
distinction, which is equally anthropocentric, dispositional, somewhat vague and yet 
perfectly objective.   
 
Perhaps registrability is what Van Fraassen has meant all along!11 He merely 
expressed this concept by the word ‘observability’.  The Characterisation of 
Observability (Obs) then is not an intensional definition of observability, with 
definiens and definiendum by definition having the same meaning, but an extensional 
criterion of ‘observability’, or, even better, an intensional definition of registrability: 
concrete object X is registrable by us iff there are circumstances such that we would 
register X if we were in those circumstances.  Then step 10 in the Inconsistency 
Argument (Section 1) fails: observation is intentional whilst registrability is not; and 
even when ‘registrable by us’ and ‘observable by us’ are co-extensive, step 10 
remains illicit and the Inconsistency Argument still falls apart. 
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In fact, the entire Inconsistency Argument against CE collapses because it commits 
the fallacy of equivocation with regard to ‘observation’. Unfortunate if not misleading 
choice of words, that is what our criticism of CE in this, for us, worst case scenario 
would boil down to. Yet even if this scenario were to transpire, we would have 
provided a clarification of the issue of observability in CE which helps one, for 
instance, to understand the opposition that Van Fraassen’s view on observability has 
provoked over the past decades: critics thought of observation as of doxastic 
observation [E3] or doxastic-seeing [E4], or both, for the simple reason that these 
intentional concepts are indispensable in order to make sense of science (the aim of 
CE), and they thought Van Fraassen meant that, whilst camera-like visual 
registration [E1] was all that he meant in the first place when talking about 
observabililty – to repeat, if  this is what he meant all along.12 Perhaps the Van 
Fraassen of The Scientific Image was not clear, and perhaps even somewhat confused 
about the finer distinctions in the process of observation that we have drawn [E1—
E4], in which case our criticism is stronger than merely a charge of unfortunate 
choice of words; for then we charge Van Fraassen with being conceptually confused.   
 
Specifically, observability is not observation: the presence of observable (registrable) 
objects is necessary for observation but not sufficient: what must be added is the 
observer’s specific intentional action of paying visual attention for the purpose of 
acquiring beliefs about the observable object of visual attention [E3.b] and his 
capacity to expresses those beliefs in language when successful [E4]. So when Van 
Fraassen compares humans with pieces of measurement apparatus when it comes to 
observation13, this comparison ignores the intentional character of obervation in 
science [E3, E4]. When comparing humans to pieces of measurement apparatus, we 
are speaking about registrability and only about registrability, not about observation. 
 
(B) The second way out is to reconsider the non-reducibility of intentional concepts to 
physicalist ones and renounce Anti-Reductionism (AR), and then perhaps seeking 
refuge among the ranks of the Neuromaniacs (Churchland cs). Such a re-
consideration is not ours to indulge in; it is up to the creator of CE.   
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At this point there is nothing else to do for us than to wait eagerly for Van Fraassen’s 
decision which exit strategy he chooses, (A) or (B), or perhaps some unconceived 
alternative. 
 
Whatever way out will be the chosen one, (A) or (B), or perhaps yet another one, we 
claim to have provided a clarification, if not disentangled a conceptual confusion of 
issues central to CE, namely the issues of observation, observability and 
registrability. The nature of our clarification will depend on which exit strategy will be 
the chosen one, and we predict that (A) will be the way to go for CE. Finally, we also 
claim that we have exposed a lacuna in CE that has been overlooked: an account of 
full-blooded intentional observation in science [E2, E3, E4] – of which we have 
sketched only the barest of outlines in the previous two Sections.  A lacuna with 
regard to observation and observability is rather surprising for today’s most 
prominent empiricist. Yet this is what we must conclude. 
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6 Fraassen (2004: 468). 
 
7 Cf. Dretske’s ‘non-epistemic seeing’ (1969: 18–20). 
 
8 See Dretske (1969: 78–79). 
 
9 Monton & Van Fraassen (2003: 409), our italics; see further Muller (2005: 61−83) for a 
specification of general circumstances of observability. 
 
10 Cf. Miller (1987: 360). 
 
11 Dretske also uses ‘observability’ to mean ‘registrability’ (1969: 203). 
 
12 We point out that Muller’s (2005) physicalist characterisation of observability is, then, 
better seen as characterising and even defining registerability-by-us. 
 
13 Fraassen (1980: 17−19). 
